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Abstract
In this paper we study a two person zero sum stochastic differential game in weak
formulation. Unlike standard literature which uses strategy type of controls, the weak
formulation allows us to consider the game with control against control. We shall
prove the existence of game value under natural conditions. Another main feature of
the paper is that we allow for non-Markovian structure, and thus the game value is a
random process. We characterize the value process as the unique viscosity solution of the
corresponding path dependent Bellman-Isaacs equation, a notion recently introduced
by Ekren, Keller, Touzi and Zhang [14] and Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [15, 16, 17].
Key words: Zero sum games, weak formulation, Path dependent PDEs, viscosity solutions,
Dynamic programming principles.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper Fleming and Souganidis [19], two person zero sum stochastic differ-
ential games have been studied extensively in the literature, see e.g. [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [7],
[13], [18], [21], [22], [23], [27], [34], to mention a few. There are typically two approaches.
One is to use the viscosity theory, namely to show that the value function of the game is
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the proof of Lemma 6.3.
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the unique viscosity solution of the associated Bellman-Isaacs equation, and the other is to
use the Backward SDE approach, which characterizes the value process as the solution to
a related BSDE.
To be precise, let u and v denote the controls of the two players, B a Brownian motion,
XS,u,v the controlled state process in the strong formulation:
X
S,u,v
t = x+
∫ t
0
b(s, us, vs)ds +
∫ t
0
σ(s, us, vs)dBs, (1.1)
and J(u, v) the corresponding value (utility or cost) which is determined by XS,u,v, B, and
(u, v). The lower and upper values of the game are defined as:
V 0 := sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
J(u, v), V 0 := inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
J(u, v),
where U and V are appropriate sets of admissible controls. It is clear that V 0 ≤ V 0. Two
central problems in the game literature are:
(i) When does the game value exists, namely V0 := V 0 = V 0?
(ii) Given the existence of the game value, is there a saddle point? That is, we want to
find (u∗, v∗) ∈ U × V such that V0 = J(u∗, v∗) = infv∈V J(u∗, v) = supu∈U J(u, v∗).
However, even under reasonable assumptions, the game value may not exist. We shall
provide a counterexample, see Example 8.1 below, which is due to Buckdahn.
To overcome the difficulty, Fleming and Souganidis [19] introduced strategy types of
controls:
V ′0 := sup
α∈A
inf
v∈V
J(α(v), v), V
′
0 := inf
β∈B
sup
u∈U
J(u, β(u)),
Here α : V → U and β : U → V are so called strategies and A, B are appropriate sets of
admissible strategies. Under the Isaacs condition and assuming the comparison principle for
the viscosity solution of the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation holds, [19] showed that
V ′0 = V
′
0. This work has been extended by many authors in various aspects. In particular,
Buckdahn and Li [5] defined J(u, v) via Backward SDEs, and very recently Bayraktar and
Yao [1] used doubly reflected BSDEs. The main drawback of this approach, however, is
that the two players have non-symmetric information, and for V ′0 and V
′
0, the roles of two
players are switched. Consequently, it is less convenient to study the saddle point in this
setting.
We propose to attack the problem in weak formulation, which is more convenient for
proving the Dynamic Programming Principle. Note that in (1.1) the controls (u, v) actually
mean u(B·), v(B·). Our weak formulation is equivalent to the following feedback type of
controls:
X
W,u,v
t = x+
∫ t
0
b(s, us(X
W,u,v
· ), vs(X
W,u,v
· ))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s, us(X
W,u,v
· ), vs(X
W,u,v
· ))dBs,(1.2)
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Here XW,u,v· denotes the path of X
W,u,v and the superscript W stands for weak formulation.
Under natural assumptions, we show that the game value does exist. The advantage of the
weak formulation setting is that we are using control against control, thus one can define the
saddle point naturally. When there is only drift control, namely σ is independent of (u, v),
one can prove the existence of saddle point under mild conditions. However, when there is
diffusion control, the problem is much more involved. We shall obtain some approximate
saddle point.
We remark that, when there is only drift control, the weak formulation has already been
used in the literature, see Bensoussan and Lions [2] for Markovian case and Hamadene and
Lepetier [21] for non-Markovian case. The former one relies on PDE arguments and the
latter one uses Backward SDEs. The advantage in this case is that one can easily obtain
the weak solution of SDE (1.2) by applying the Girsanov Theorem. Our general case with
diffusion control has different nature. Roughly speaking, the drift control is associated with
semi-linear PDEs, while the diffusion control is associate with fully nonlinear PDEs. We
also note that, in a Markovian model but also with optimal stopping problem, Karatzas and
Sudderth [23] studied the game problem with diffusion control in weak formulation, under
certain strong conditions.
Another main feature of our paper is that we study the game in non-Markovian frame-
work, or say in a path dependent manner. The standard approach in the literature, e.g.
[19] and [5], is to prove that the lower value and the upper value are a viscosity solution (or
viscosity semi-solution) of the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation, then by assuming
the comparison principle for the viscosity solution of the PDE, one obtains the existence of
the game value. These works rely on the PDE arguments and thus works only in Markovian
setting. In a series of papers, Ekren, Keller, Touzi and Zhang [14] and Ekren, Touzi and
Zhang [15, 16, 17] introduced a notion of viscosity solution for the so called path dependent
PDEs and established its wellposedness. This enables us to extend the above approach to
path dependent setting. Indeed, based on the dynamic programming principle we establish,
we show that the lower value and the upper value of the game are viscosity solutions of the
corresponding path dependent Bellman-Isaacs equations. Then, under the Isaacs condition
and assuming the uniqueness of viscosity solutions, we characterize the game value as the
unique viscosity solution of the path dependent Bellman-Isaacs equation.
Finally we remark that, due to weak formulation with diffusion control, this paper
is by nature closely related to the second order BSDEs (2BSDEs, for short) introduced
by Cheridito, Soner, Touzi and Vicoir [8] and Soner, Touzi and Zhang [31, 32], and the G-
expectation introduced by Peng [29]. While more involved here, our arguments for Dynamic
Programming Principle follow the idea in [31, 32] and Peng [28]. However, G-expectations
and 2BSDEs involve only stochastic optimization and thus the generator is convex in terms
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of the hessian. Consequently, the dynamic value process is a supermartingale under each
associated probability measure. For our game problem, the Bellman-Isaacs equation is non-
convex, and the value process is not a supermartingale anymore. Under additional technical
conditions, we conjecture that our value process will be a semi-martingale. This requires to
develop a semi-martingale theory under nonlinear expectation and to generalize the 2BSDE
theory to non-convex generators. We established some norm estimates for semi-martingales
in another paper Pham and Zhang [30] and will leave the general 2BSDE theory for future
research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some preliminaries.
The game problem is introduced in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5 we prove the dynamic
programming principle and the viscosity property, respectively. In Section 6 we study the
comparison principle for PPDEs and in Section 7 we investigate approximate saddle points.
Finally some technical proofs are presented Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The canonical space
Let Ω :=
{
ω ∈ C([0, T ],Rd) : ω0 = 0
}
, the set of continuous paths starting from the
origin, B the canonical process, F the filtration generated by B, P0 the Wiener measure,
and Λ := [0, T ] × Ω. Here and in the sequel, for notational simplicity we use 0 to denote
vectors or matrices with appropriate dimensions whose components are all equal to 0. Let
S
d denote the set of d× d matrices, Sd≥0 := {σ ∈ Sd : σ ≥ 0}, and
x · x′ :=∑di=1 xix′i for any x, x′ ∈ Rd, γ : γ′ := Trace[γγ′] for any γ, γ′ ∈ Sd.
We define a norm on Ω and a metric on Λ as follows: for any (t, ω), (t′, ω′) ∈ Λ,
‖ω‖t := sup
0≤s≤t
|ωs|, d∞
(
(t, ω), (t′, ω′)
)
:= |t− t′|+ ∥∥ω.∧t − ω′.∧t′∥∥T . (2.3)
Then (Ω, ‖ · ‖T ) and (Λ,d∞) are complete metric spaces.
Definition 2.1 Let Y : Λ→ R be an F-progressively measurable process.
(i) We say Y ∈ L∞(Λ) if Y is bounded.
(ii) We say Y ∈ C0(Λ) (resp. UC(Λ)) if Y is continuous (resp. uniformly continuous) in
(t, ω). Moreover, we denote C0b (Λ) := C
0(Λ) ∩ L∞(Λ) and UCb(Λ) := UC(Λ) ∩ L∞(Λ).
(iii)We say Y ∈ U if Y is bounded from above, upper semi-continuous (u.s.c. for short) from
right in t, and there exists a modulus of continuity function ρ such that for (t, ω), (t′, ω′) ∈ Λ:
Y (t, ω)− Y (t′, ω′) ≤ ρ(d∞((t, ω), (t′, ω′))) whenever t ≤ t′, (2.4)
and we say Y ∈ U if −Y ∈ U .
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It is clear that U ∩ U = UCb(Λ). Moreover, we denote by L∞(Λ,Rd) the space of Rd-
valued processes whose components are in L∞(Λ), and define other similar notations in the
same spirit.
We next introduce the shifted spaces. Let 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T .
- Let Ωt :=
{
ω ∈ C([t, T ],Rd) : ωt = 0
}
be the shifted canonical space; Bt the shifted
canonical process on Ωt; Ft the shifted filtration generated by Bt, Pt0 the Wiener measure
on Ωt, and Λt := [t, T ]× Ωt.
- Define ‖ · ‖s on Ωt, d∞ on Λt×Λt, and C0(Λt) etc. in the spirit of (2.3) and Definition
2.1.
- For ω ∈ Ωs and ω′ ∈ Ωt, define the concatenation path ω ⊗t ω′ ∈ Ωs by:
(ω ⊗t ω′)(r) := ωr1[s,t)(r) + (ωt + ωˆ′r)1[t,T ](r), for all r ∈ [s, T ].
- Let s ∈ [0, T ) and ω ∈ Ωs. For an FsT -measurable random variable ξ, an Fs-
progressively measurable process X on Ωs, and t ∈ (s, T ], define the shifted F tT -measurable
random variable ξt,ω and Ft-progressively measurable process Xt,ω on Ωt by:
ξt,ω(ω′) := ξ(ω ⊗t ω′), Xt,ω(ω′) := X(ω ⊗t ω′), for all ω′ ∈ Ωt.
It is clear that, for any (t, ω) ∈ Λ and any Y ∈ L∞(Λ), we have Y t,ω ∈ L∞(Λt). Similarly
the property holds for other spaces defined in Definition 2.1.
2.2 Probability measures
In this subsection we introduce the probability measures on Ωt in different formulations.
First, let σ ∈ L∞(Λ,Sd≥0), b ∈ L∞(Λ,Rd). Define
P
S,σ,b := P0 ◦ (XS,σ,b)−1 where XS,σ,bt :=
∫ t
0
bsds+
∫ t
0
σsdBs, P0-a.s. (2.5)
Here the superscript S stands for strong formulation. We next introduce the corresponding
weak formulation. We denote a probability measure P on Ω as PW,σ,b if
M bt := Bt −
∫ t
0
bsds is a P-martingale and 〈M b〉t =
∫ t
0
σ2sds P-a.s. (2.6)
Here the quadratic variation 〈M b〉 is under P. We remark that PW,σ,b := P0 ◦ (XW,σ,b)−1,
where XW,σ,b is a weak solution of the following SDE (with random measurable coefficients):
X
W,σ,b
t :=
∫ t
0
bs(X
W,σ,b
· )ds+
∫ t
0
σs(X
W,σ,b
· )dBs, P0-a.s. (2.7)
In other words, we are considering feedback type of controls.
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In this paper we shall use the weak formulation, which is more convenient for proving
Dynamical Programming Principle. We note that, for arbitrarily given (σ, b), the SDE (2.7)
may not have a weak solution, namely there is no P such that P = PW,σ,b. Let
Ξ
W
:=
{
(σ, b) ∈ L∞(Λ,Sd≥0)× L∞(Λ,Rd) : SDE (2.7) has a unique weak solution
}
;
Ξ
S
:=
{
(σ, b) ∈ L∞(Λ,Sd≥0)× L∞(Λ,Rd) : SDE (2.7) has a unique strong solution
}
.
(2.8)
For probability measures on the shifted space Ωt, we define PS,t,σ,b, PW,t,σ,b, and Ξ
W,t
, Ξ
S,t
,
etc. similarly.
We next introduce the regular conditional probability distribution (r.c.p.d for short) due
to Stroock and Varadhan [33]. We shall follow the presentation in Soner, Touzi and Zhang
[31]. Let P be an arbitrary probability measure on Ω and τ be an F- stopping time. The
r.c.p.d. {Pτ,ω, ω ∈ Ω} satisfies:
• For each ω, Pτ,ω is a probability measure on Fτ(ω)T ;
• For every bounded FT -measurable random variable ξ:
E
P
[
ξ|Fτ
]
(ω) = EP
τ,ω[
ξτ(ω),ω
]
, P-a.s. (2.9)
The following simple lemma will be important for the proof of Dynamic Programming
Principle in Section 4 below. Its proof is postponed to Appendix.
Lemma 2.2 Let (σ, b) ∈ ΞS (resp. ΞW ), t ∈ [0, T ], {Ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ⊂ Ft be a partition of
Ω, and (σi, bi) ∈ ΞS,t(resp. ΞW,t). Define
σ¯(ω) := σ(ω)1[0,t) +
n∑
i=1
σi(ωt)1Ei1[t,T ], b¯(ω) := b(ω)1[0,t) +
n∑
i=1
bi(ωt)1Ei1[t,T ].
Then (σ¯, b¯) ∈ ΞS (resp. ΞW ), and, for i = 1, · · · , n,
P
σ¯,b¯ = Pσ,b on Ft and
(
P
σ¯,b¯
)t,ω
= Pt,σ
i,bi for Pσ,b-a.e. ω ∈ Ei.
2.3 Viscosity solutions of path dependent PDEs
Our notion of viscosity solutions of Path Dependent PDEs (PPDEs for short) is introduced
by Ekren, Keller, Touzi and Zhang [14] for semilinear PPDE and Ekren, Touzi and Zhang
[15, 16] for fully nonlinear PPDE. We follow the presentation in [15, 16] here.
For any constant L > 0, denote
PtL :=
{
P
W,t,σ,b : |b| ≤ L,0 ≤ σ ≤
√
2LId
}
, and Pt∞ := ∪L>0PtL. (2.10)
We remark that in PtL we do not require the uniqueness of weak solution.
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Let Y ∈ C0(Λ). For t ∈ [0, T ), we define the right time-derivative, if it exists, as in
Dupire [12] and Cont and Fournie [9]:
∂tY (t, ω) := lim
h↓0
1
h
[
Y
(
t+ h, ω·∧t
)− Y (t, ω)]. (2.11)
For the final time T , we define, whenever the following limit exists:
∂tY (T, ω) := lim
t↑T
∂tY (t, ω). (2.12)
Definition 2.3 (i) We say Y ∈ C1,2(Λ) if Y ∈ C0(Λ), ∂tY ∈ C0(Λ), and there exist
∂ωY ∈ C0(Λ,Rd), ∂2ωωY ∈ C0(Λ,Sd) such that, for any (s, ω) ∈ [0, T )×Ω and any P ∈ Ps∞,
Y s,ω is a local P-semimartingale and it holds:
dY
s,ω
t = (∂tYt)
s,ωdt+ (∂ωYt)
s,ω · dBst +
1
2
(∂2ωωYt)
s,ω : d〈Bs〉t, P-a.s. (2.13)
(ii) We say Y ∈ C1,2b (Λ) if Y ∈ UCb(Λ), ∂tY ∈ C0b (Λ), and the above ∂ωY and ∂2ωωY exist
and are in C0b (Λ,R
d) and C0b (Λ,S
d), respectively.
Next, let T denote the set of F-stopping times, and H ⊂ T the subset of those hitting
times h taking the following form: for some open and convex set O ⊂ Rd containing 0 and
some 0 < t0 ≤ T ,
h := inf{t : Bt ∈ Oc} ∧ t0 = inf{t : d(ωt, Oc) = 0} ∧ t0. (2.14)
We may define C1,2(Λt), C1,2b (Λ
t), T t, and Ht similarly. It is clear that, for any (t, ω)
and Y ∈ C1,2(Λ) (resp. Y ∈ C1,2b (Λ)), we have Y t,ω ∈ C1,2(Λt)(resp. Y t,ω ∈ C1,2b (Λ)), and
for any h ∈ H such that h(ω) > t, we have ht,ω ∈ Ht.
For any L > 0, (t, ω) ∈ Λ with t < T , and F-adapted process Y , define
ALY (t, ω) :=
{
ϕ ∈ C1,2b (Λt) : for some h ∈ Ht,
(ϕ− Y t,ω)(t,0) = inf
τ∈T t
inf
P∈Pt
L
E
P
[
(ϕ− Y t,ω)τ∧h
]}
,
ALY (t, ω) :=
{
ϕ ∈ C1,2b (Λt) : for some h ∈ Ht,
(ϕ− Y t,ω)(t,0) = sup
τ∈T t
sup
P∈Pt
L
E
P
[
(ϕ− Y t,ω)τ∧h
]}
.
(2.15)
We are now ready to introduce the viscosity solution of PPDEs. Consider the following
PPDE with generator G:
− ∂tYt −G(t, ω, Yt, ∂ωYt, ∂2ωωYt) = 0. (2.16)
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Definition 2.4 (i) Let L > 0. We say Y ∈ U (resp. U) is a viscosity L-subsolution (resp.
L-supersolution) of PPDE (2.16) if, for any (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ) × Ω and any ϕ ∈ ALY (t, ω)
(resp. ϕ ∈ ALY (t, ω)):(
− ∂tϕ−Gt,ω(., Y t,ω, ∂ωϕ, ∂2ωωϕ)
)
(t,0) ≤ (resp. ≥) 0.
(ii) We say Y ∈ U (resp. U) is a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) of PPDE (2.16)
if Y is viscosity L-subsolution (resp. L-supersolution) of PPDE (2.16) for some L > 0.
(iii) We say Y ∈ UCb(Λ) is a viscosity solution of PPDE (2.16) if it is both a viscosity
subsolution and a viscosity supersolution.
Remark 2.5 For 0 < L1 < L2, obviously PtL1 ⊆ PtL2 and AL2Y (t, ω) ⊆ AL1Y (t, ω). Then
one can easily check that a viscosity L1-subsolution must be a viscosity L2-subsolution.
Consequently, Y is a viscosity solution of PPDE (2.16) iff there exists an L ≥ 1 such that
for all L˜ ≥ L, Y is a viscosity L˜-subsolution. However, we require the same L for all (t, ω).
A similar statement holds for the viscosity supersolution.
Remark 2.6 (i) In the Markovian case, namely Y (t, ω) = Y (t, ωt) and G = g(t, ωt, y, z, γ),
our definition of viscosity solution is stronger than the standard viscosity solution in PDE
literature. That is, Y is a viscosity solution in our sense implies it is a viscosity solution in
the standard sense as in Crandall, Ishii, and Lions [10].
(ii) The state space Λ of PPDEs is not locally compact, and thus the standard arguments
by using Ishii’s lemma do not work in path dependent case. The main idea of [14, 15, 16] is
to transform the definition to an optimal stopping problem in (3.2), which helps to obtain
the comparison and hence the uniqueness of viscosity solutions.
3 The zero-sum game
3.1 The admissible controls
Let U and V be two Borel measurable spaces equipped with some topology. From now on
we shall fix two F-progressively measurable mapping:
σ : [0, T ]× U× V→ Sd≥0, b : [0, T ]× U× V→ Rd.
We shall always assume
Assumption 3.1 σ and b are bounded by a constant C0.
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For t ∈ [0, T ], let U t (resp. Vt) denote the set of U-valued (resp. V-valued), Ft-
progressively measurable processes u (resp. v) on Λt. Throughout the paper, when (u, v) ∈
U t × Vt is given, for any process ϕ on Λt with appropriate dimension, we denote
ϕ̂s := ϕ̂
t,u,v
s := ϕsσ(s, us, vs). (3.1)
Define
Ξt :=
{
(u, v) ∈ U t × Vt : (σ(·, u, v), b̂(·, u, v)) ∈ AS,t
}
Xt,u,v := XW,t,σ(u,v),̂b(u,v), Pt,u,v := PW,t,σ(u,v),̂b(u,v), for (u, v) ∈ Ξt.
(3.2)
We note that, from now on, the σ, b in previous section will actually be σ(t, ut, vt) and
b̂(t, ut, vt) for some (u, v) ∈ A0. In particular, for the convenience of studying the BSDE
later, we are considering SDE in the form
Xt,u,vs =
∫ s
t
σ(r, ur(X
t,u,v
· ), vr(X
t,u,v
· ))
[
dBtr + b(r, ur(X
t,u,v
· ), vr(X
t,u,v
· ))dr
]
, Pt0-a.s. (3.3)
Moreover, one can easily check that there exists a Pt,u,v-Brownian motion W t,u,v such that
dBts = σ(s, us, vs)
[
dW t,u,vs + b(s, us, vs)ds
]
, Pt,u,v-a.s. (3.4)
To formulate the game problem, we shall restrict the controls to subsets Ut ⊂ U t and
Vt ⊂ Vt whose elements u and v take the following form:
u =
m−1∑
i=0
ni∑
j=1
uij1Ei
j
1[ti,ti+1), v =
m−1∑
i=0
ni∑
j=1
vij1Ei
j
1[ti,ti+1), where (3.5)
t = t0 < · · · < tm = T, {Eij}1≤j≤ni ⊂ F tti is a partition, and uij , vij are constants.
It is clear that, for u ∈ U t,
u ∈ Ut if and only if u takes finitely many values. (3.6)
We have the following simple lemma whose proof is provided in Appendix for completeness.
Lemma 3.2 (i) U0 is closed under pasting. That is, for u ∈ U0, t ∈ [0, T ], ui ∈ Ut,
i = 1, · · · , n, and disjoint {Ei, i = 1, · · · , n} ⊂ Ft, the following u is also in U0:
u := u1[0,t) +
[ n∑
i=1
ui(ωt)1Ei + u1∩ni=1Eci
]
1[t,T ].
(ii) Under Assumption 3.1, it holds Ut × Vt ⊂ Ξt.
Proof. In light of (3.6), (i) is obvious. To see (ii), we notice that any pair of constant
processes (u, v) is obviously in Ξt. Then (ii) follows from repeated use of Lemma 2.2.
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3.2 The Backward SDEs
Let f(t, ω, y, z, u, v) : Λ×R×Rd ×U×V→ R be an F-progressively measurable nonlinear
generator. Throughout the paper, we shall assume
Assumption 3.3 (i) f(t, ω, 0,0, u, v) is bounded by a constant C0, and uniformly contin-
uous in (t, ω) with a modulus of continuity function ρ0.
(ii) f is uniformly Lipschitz in (y, z) with a Lipschitz constant L0.
Now for any (t, ω) ∈ Λ, (u, v) ∈ Ut × Vt, τ ∈ T t, and F tτ -measurable terminal condition
η, recall the notation (3.1) and consider the following BSDE on [t, τ ]:
Ys = η +
∫ τ
s
f t,ω(r,Bt· ,Yr, Ẑr, ur, vr)dr −
∫ τ
s
ZrdBtr, Pt,u,v-a.s. (3.7)
We have the following simple lemma whose proof is presented in Appendix for completeness.
Lemma 3.4 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 (ii) hold, and
I20 (t, ω, u, v) := E
Pt,u,v
[
|η|2 +
∫ τ
t
|f t,ω(s,Bt· , 0,0, us, vs)|2ds
]
<∞.
Then BSDE (3.7) has a unique solution, denoted as
(Yt,ω,u,v[τ, η],Zt,ω,u,v [τ, η]), and there
exists a constant C, depending only on C0, L0, T , and the dimension d, such that
E
Pt,u,v
[
sup
t≤s≤τ
|Yt,ω,u,vs [τ, η]|2 +
∫ τ
t
|Ẑt,ω,u,vs [τ, η]|2ds
]
≤ CI20 (t, ω, u, v). (3.8)
Moreover, if τ ≤ t+ δ, then
E
Pt,u,v
[
sup
t≤s≤τ
|Yt,ω,u,vs [τ, η]|
]
≤ C
(
E
Pt,u,v [|η|2]
) 1
2
+ Cδ
1
2 I0(t, ω, u, v). (3.9)
Throughout the paper, we shall use the generic constant C which depends only on C0, L0,
T , and the dimension d, and may vary from line to line.
3.3 The value processes
We now fix an FT -measurable terminal condition ξ and assume throughout the paper:
Assumption 3.5 ξ is bounded by a constant C0, and is uniformly continuous in ω with a
modulus of continuity function ρ0.
We now define the lower value and upper value of the game as follows:
Y (t, ω) := sup
u∈Ut
inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ω,u,vt [T, ξt,ω]; Y (t, ω) := inf
v∈Vt
sup
u∈Ut
Yt,ω,u,vt [T, ξt,ω]. (3.10)
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As a direct consequence of Lemma 3.4, we have
− C ≤ Y ≤ Y ≤ C. (3.11)
When there is no confusion, we will simplify the notations:
(Yt,ω,u,v,Zt,ω,u,v) := (Yt,ω,u,v[T, ξt,ω],Zt,ω,u,v[T, ξt,ω]). (3.12)
Our goal of this paper is to show, under certain additional assumptions, that Y = Y and it
is the unique viscosity solution of certain PPDE. See Theorem 5.1 below.
Remark 3.6 (i) In this paper we restrict our controls to Ut × Vt ⊂ Ξt. We note that in
general U t × Vt is not in Ξt. We may study the following problem though:
Y ′(t, ω) := sup
u∈Ut
inf
v∈Vt(u)
Yt,ω,u,vt , Y
′
(t, ω) := inf
v∈Vt
sup
u∈Ut(v)
Yt,ω,u,vt ,
where
Vt(u) :=
{
v ∈ Vt : (u, v) ∈ Ξt
}
, U t(v) :=
{
u ∈ U t : (u, v) ∈ Ξt
}
,
and we take the convention that, for the empty set φ, supφ[·] = ∞ and infφ[·] = −∞.
However, we will be able to prove only partial Dynamic Programming Principle in this
formulation.
(ii) Another important constraint we impose is that σ and b are independent of ω. When
σ and b are random, given (t, ω) ∈ Λ, the solution Xt,ω,u,v of SDE (3.3) and its distribution
P
t,ω,u,v will depend on ω as well. This has some subtle consequences, e.g. in Lemma 4.1
concerning the regularity of the value processes. The main difficulty is that we do not have
a good stability result for feedback type of SDEs (3.3). We hope to address this issue in
future research.
(iii) Note that we may get rid of the drift b by using Girsanov transformation, so all our
results hold true when b is random, given that σ is independent of ω. However, to simplify
the presentation we assume b is independent of ω as well.
Remark 3.7 For each (u, v) ∈ U0 × V0, denote u˜t := ut(Xu,v) and v˜t := vt(Xu,v). Then
(u˜, v˜) ∈ U0 × V0 and Pu,v = PS,u˜,v˜ := PS,σ(u˜,v˜),̂b(u˜,v˜). Thus we have Y0,0,u,v0 = YS,u˜,v˜0 , where,
X
u,v
t =
∫ t
0
σ(s, u˜s, v˜s)
[
dBs + b(s, u˜s, v˜s)ds
]
;
YS,u˜,v˜t = ξ(Xu,v) +
∫ T
t
f(s,X u˜,v˜· ,YS,u˜,v˜s , ẐS,u˜,v˜s , u˜s, v˜s)ds−
∫ T
t
ZS,u˜,v˜s dBs,
P0-a.s.
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However, we shall emphasize that the mapping from (u, v) to (u˜, v˜) is in pairs, and it does
not induce a mapping from u to u˜ (or from v to v˜). Consequently the game values defined
below in strong formulation are different from the Y 0 and Y 0 in (3.10):
Y S0 := sup
u˜∈U0
inf
v˜∈V0
YS,u˜,v˜0 , Y
S
0 := inf
v˜∈V0
sup
u˜∈U0
YS,u˜,v˜0 .
Indeed, in strong formulation the above game with control against control may not have the
game value, namely Y S0 < Y
S
0 , even if Isaacs condition and comparison principle for the vis-
cosity solutions of the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation hold. See the counterexample
Example 8.1 below.
Remark 3.8 (i) In standard literature, see e.g. [19] and [5], one transforms the problem
into a game with strategy type of controls. That is, let α : Vt → Ut and β : Ut → Vt be
appropriate strategies. One considers:
Y ”(t, ω) := sup
α
inf
v
Yt,ω,α(v),vt , Y
”
(t, ω) := inf
β
sup
u
Yt,ω,u,β(u)t ,
This type of control problem is in fact a principal-agent problem, see e.g. Cvitanic and
Zhang [11]. In Markovian framework and under appropriate conditions, one can show
that Y ” = Y
”
and is the unique solution of the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation.
However, in this formulation the two players have nonsymmetric informations, and the
lower and upper values are defined using different information settings. In particular, it is
less convenient to define saddle point in this formulation.
(ii) Our weak formulation actually has the feature of strategy type of controls. Indeed,
consider the (u˜, v˜) in Remark 3.7 again. Roughly speaking, given u, then u˜ is uniquely
determined by v, which is in turn uniquely determined by v˜. Thus u can be viewed as
a strategy α which maps v˜ (and B) to u˜. Similarly v can be viewed as a strategy β
which maps u˜ (and B) to v˜. Compared to the strategy against control, the advantage of
weak formulation is that it is control against control and the two players have symmetric
information.
Remark 3.9 When there is only drift control, namely σ is independent of (u, v), our for-
mulation reduces to the work Hamadene and Lepeltier [21]. Under Isaacs condition, by
using Girsanov transformation and comparison for BSDEs, they proved Y = Y and the
existence of saddle point. We allow for both diffusion control and drift control, and we shall
prove Y = Y . However, when there is diffusion control, the comparison used in [21] fails.
Consequently, we are not able to follow the arguments in [21] to establish the existence of
saddle point. Indeed, with the presence of diffusion control, even for stochastic optimization
problem the optimal control does not seem to exist in general. We shall instead obtain some
approximate saddle point in Section 7 below.
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4 Dynamic Programming Principle
We start with the regularity of Y and Y in ω. This property is straightforward in strong
formulation. Our proof here relies heavily on our assumption that σ and b are independent
of ω. As pointed out in Remark 3.6 (ii), the problem is very subtle in general case and we
hope to address it in some future research.
Lemma 4.1 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 hold. Then Y and Y are uniformly contin-
uous in ω with modulus of continuity function Cρ0 for some constant C > 0. Consequently,
Y and Y are F-progressively measurable.
Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ], ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. For any (u, v) ∈ Ut × Vt, denote ∆Y := Yt,ω,u,v −
Yt,ω′,u,v,∆Z := Zt,ω,u,v −Zt,ω′,u,v. Then, Pt,u,v-a.s.
∆Ys = ξt,ω(Bt· )− ξt,ω
′
(Bt· )−
∫ T
s
∆ZrdBr +
∫ T
s
[
αr∆Yr +∆Ẑrσ(r, ur , vr)βr
+[f t,ω(r,Bt,Yt,ω,u,vr , Ẑt,ω,u,vr , ur, vr)− f t,ω
′
(r,Bt,Yt,ω,u,vr , Ẑt,ω,u,vr , ur, vr)]
]
dr,
where α and β are bounded. Apply (3.8) on the above BSDE, one obtains
|Yt,ω,u,vt −Yt,ω
′,u,v
t | ≤ Cρ0(‖ω − ω′‖t). (4.1)
Thus
|Y t(ω)− Y t(ω′)| ≤ sup
(u,v)∈Ut×Vt
|Yt,ω,u,vt − Yt,ω
′,u,v
t | ≤ Cρ0(‖ω − ω′‖t).
Similarly one can prove the estimate for Y .
The following Dynamical Programming Principle is important for us.
Lemma 4.2 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 hold true. For any 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T and
ω ∈ Ω we have
Y s(ω) = sup
u∈Us
inf
v∈Vs
Ys,ω,u,vs
[
t, Y
s,ω
t
]
; Y s(ω) = inf
v∈Vs
sup
u∈Us
Ys,ω,u,vs
[
t, Y
s,ω
t
]
.
To prove the lemma we need a technical lemma. Its proof is standard but lengthy, and
is postponed to Appendix in order not to distract our main arguments.
Lemma 4.3 For any ε > 0 and t ∈ (0, T ), there exist disjoint sets {Ei, i = 1, · · · , n} ⊆ Ft
such that
‖ω − ω′‖t ≤ ε for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ei, i = 1, · · · , n, and sup
(u,v)∈U0×V0
E
P0,u,v
( ∩ni=1 Eci ) ≤ ε.
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Proof of Lemma 4.2. We shall prove only the Dynamic Programming Principle for Y .
The proof for Y is similar. Without loss of generality, we assume s = 0. That is, we shall
prove:
Y 0 = sup
u∈U0
inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,u,v0 [t, Y t]. (4.2)
Step 1. We first prove ”≥”. Fix arbitrary ε > 0 and u ∈ U0. Let {Ei, i = 1, · · · , n} ⊂ Ft
be given by Lemma 4.3, and fix an ωi ∈ Ei for each i. For any ω ∈ Ei, By Lemma 4.1 and
(4.1) we have
|Y t(ω)− Y t(ωi)| ≤ Cρ0(ε) and sup
(u,v)∈Ut×Vt
∣∣Yt,ω,u,vt − Yt,ωi,u,vt ∣∣ ≤ Cρ0(ε). (4.3)
Let ui ∈ Ut be an ε-optimizer of Y t(ωi), that is,
inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ωi,ui,vt + ε ≥ Y t(ωi). (4.4)
Denote Eˆn := ∩ni=1(Ei)c. By Lemma 3.2 (i) we define uε ∈ U0 by:
uεs(ω) := us(ω)1[0,t)(s) +
[ n∑
i=1
uis(ω
t)1Ei(ω) + us(ω)1Eˆn(ω)
]
1[t,T ](s) (4.5)
Now for any v ∈ V0, we have
Y0,0,uε,v0 = Y0,0,u
ε,v
0
(
t,Y0,0,uε,vt
)
= Y0,0,uε,v0
[
t,
n∑
i=1
Y0,0,uε,vt 1Ei + Y0,0,u
ε,v
t 1Eˆn
]
.
Since solutions of BSDEs can be constructed via Picard iteration, one can easily check that,
for any (u, v) ∈ U0 × V0,
Y0,0,u,vt (ω) = Yt,ω,u
t,ω ,vt,ω
t , P
0,u,v-a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
Then it follows from (4.4) and Lemma 2.2 that, for P0,u
ε,v-a.e. ω ∈ Ei,
Y0,0,uε,vt (ω) = Yt,ω,(u
ε)t,ω,vt,ω
t = Yt,ω,u
i,vt,ω
t ≥ inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ω,ui,vt
≥ inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ωi,ui,vt − Cρ0(ε) ≥ Y t(ωi)− ε− Cρ0(ε)
≥ Y t(ω)− ε− Cρ0(ε).
Therefore, by comparison principle of BSDEs and (3.11) we have
Y0,0,uε,v0 ≥ Y0,0,u
ε,v
0
[
t,
n∑
i=1
Y t1Ei − (ε+ Cρ0(ε)) + Y0,0,u
ε,v
t 1Eˆn
]
≥ Y0,0,uε,v0
[
t, Y t − (ε+ Cρ0(ε)) −C1Eˆn
]
.
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Recall that sup(u,v)∈U0×V0 P
0,u,v
(
Eˆn
) ≤ ε. Applying (3.9) we get
Y0,0,uε,v0 ≥ Y0,0,u
ε,v
0
[
t, Y t
]− C(ε+ ρ0(ε)) 12 = Y0,0,u,v0 [t, Y t]− C(ε+ ρ0(ε)) 12 .
Since v is arbitrary, this implies that
inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,uε,v0 ≥ inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,u,v0
[
t, Y t
]− C(ε+ ρ0(ε)) 12 .
Then
Y 0 ≥ inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,u,v0
[
t, Y t
]− C(ε+ ρ0(ε)) 12 .
Sending ε→ 0 and by the arbitrariness of u ∈ U0, we obtain
Y 0 ≥ sup
u∈U0
inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,u,v0
[
t, Y t
]
.
Step 2. We now prove ”≤”. Fix u ∈ U0 in the form of (3.5), with uij being replaced by
uij . It suffices to prove that
inf
v∈V0
Yt,0,u,v0 ≤ inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,u,v0 [t, Y t].
Without loss of generality, assume t = ti0 for some i0. Notice that Y tm = ξ, then it suffices
to prove
inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,u,v0 [ti+1, Y ti+1 ] ≤ infv∈V0 Y
0,0,u,v
0 [ti, Y ti ], for all i. (4.6)
We now fix i and recall that ut =
∑ni
j=1 uij1Eij
for t ∈ [ti, ti+1). For any ε > 0, let
{Ek, k = 1, · · · ,K} ⊂ Fti be given by Lemma 4.3. Denote Eijk := Eij ∩ Ek and fix an
ωjk ∈ Eijk for each (j, k). For any v ∈ V0, as in Step1 we have
Y0,0,u,v0 [ti, Y ti ] = Y0,0,u,v0
[
ti,
ni,K∑
j,k=1
Y ti1Eijk
+ Y ti1∩Kk=1E
c
k
]
≥ Y0,0,u,v0
[
ti,
ni,K∑
j,k=1
Y ti(ω
jk)1Ei
jk
(ω)
]
− C(ρ0(ε) + ε)
1
2 .
By Step 1, we see that
Y ti(ω
jk) ≥ sup
u∈Uti
inf
v∈Vti
Yti,ωjk,u,vti
[
ti+1, Y
ti,ω
jk
ti+1
] ≥ inf
v∈Vti
Yti,ωjk,uij ,vti
[
ti+1, Y
ti,ω
jk
ti+1
]
.
Here the constant uij denotes the constant process. Then there exists v
jk ∈ Vti such that
Y ti(ω
jk) ≥ Yti,ωjk,uij ,vjkti
[
ti+1, Y
ti,ω
jk
ti+1
]− ε.
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Now define
vˆ := v¯1[0,ti) +
[ ni,K∑
j,k=1
vjk(Bti)1Ei
jk
+ v¯1∩K
k=1
Ec
k
]
1[ti,T ].
By Lemma 3.2 we have vˆ ∈ V0. Then, noting that uti,ωt = uij for ω ∈ Eijk and t ∈ [ti, ti+1),
Y0,0,u,v0 [ti, Y ti ] ≥ Y0,0,u,v0
[ ni,K∑
j,k=1
Yti,ωjk ,uij ,vjkti
[
ti+1, Y
ti,ω
jk
ti+1
]
1Ei
jk
(ω)
]
− C(ρ0(ε) + ε)
1
2
= Y0,0,u,v0
[ ni,K∑
j,k=1
Yti,ωjk ,uti,ω ,vˆti,ωti
[
ti+1, Y
ti,ω
jk
ti+1
]
1Ei
jk
(ω)
]
− C(ρ0(ε) + ε)
1
2
≥ Y0,0,u,v0
[ ni,K∑
j,k=1
Yti,ω,uti,ω,vˆti,ωti
[
ti+1, Y
ti,ω
ti+1
]
1Ei
jk
(ω)
]
− C(ρ0(ε) + ε)
1
2
= Y0,0,u,vˆ0
[
ti+1,
ni,K∑
j,k=1
Y
ti,ω
ti+1
1Ei
jk
(ω)
]
− C(ρ0(ε) + ε)
1
2
≥ Y0,0,u,vˆ0
[
ti+1, Y ti+1
]
− C(ρ0(ε) + ε)
1
2
≥ inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,u,v0
[
ti+1, Y ti+1
]
− C(ρ0(ε) + ε)
1
2 .
Send ε→ 0, by the arbitrariness of v ∈ V0 we prove (4.6).
Remark 4.4 If we use strong formulation with control against control, as in Remark 3.7,
we can only prove the following partial Dynamic Programming Principle:
Y Ss (ω) ≤ sup
u∈Us
inf
v∈Vs
Ys,ω,PS,s,u,v[Y St ]; Y Ss (ω) ≥ inf
v∈Vs
sup
u∈Us
Ys,ω,PS,s,u,v[Y St ],
which does not lead to the desired viscosity property. That is why we use weak formulation
instead of strong formulation.
We now turn to the regularity of Y and Y in t, which is required for studying their
viscosity property.
Lemma 4.5 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 hold. Then, for any 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T and
ω ∈ Ω,
|Y t1(ω)− Y t2(ω)|+ |Y t1(ω)− Y t2(ω)| ≤ Cρ1
(
d∞((t1, ω), (t2, ω))
)
, (4.7)
where ρ1 is a modulus of continuity function defined by
ρ1(δ) := ρ0(δ + δ
1
4 ) + δ + δ
1
4 . (4.8)
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Proof. We shall only prove the regularity of Y in t. The estimate for Y can be proved
similarly. Denote δ := d∞((t1, ω), (t2, ω)).
By Theorem 4.6 and Lemma 4.1 we have∣∣∣Y t1(ω)− Y t2(ω)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ sup
u∈Ut1
inf
v∈Vt1
Yt1,ω,u,vt1
[
t2, Y
t1,ω
t2
]− Y t2(ω)
∣∣∣
≤ sup
u∈Ut1 ,v∈Vt1
∣∣Yt1,ω,u,vt1 [t2, Y t1,ωt2 ]− Y t2(ω)∣∣. (4.9)
Denote
Yt := Yt1,ω,u,vt
[
t2, Y
t1,ω
t2
]− Y t2(ω), Zt := Zt1,ω,u,vt [t2, Y t1,ωt2 ].
Then, Pt1,u,v-a.s.
Yt = Y t1,ωt2 − Y t2(ω) +
∫ t2
t
f t1,ω(s,Bt1 ,Ys + Y t2(ω), Ẑs, us, vs)ds−
∫ t2
t
ZsdBt1s .
Recall from (3.11) that Y is bounded. Apply (3.9) and Lemma 4.1, we get
|Yt1 | ≤ C
(
E
Pt1,u,v
[|Y t1,ωt2 − Y t2(ω)|2])
1
2
+ Cδ
≤ C
(
E
Pt1,u,v
[
ρ20(d∞((t2, ω), (t2, ω ⊗t1 Bt1)))
]) 1
2
+ Cδ.
Note that
E
Pt1,u,v
[
ρ20(d∞((t2, ω), (t2, ω ⊗t1 Bt1)))
] ≤ EPt1,u,v[ρ20(δ + ‖Bt1‖t2)]]
≤ ρ20(δ + δ
1
4 ) + CPt1,u,v
[
‖Bt1‖t2 ≥ δ
1
4
]
≤ ρ20(δ + δ
1
4 ) + Cδ−
1
2E
Pt1,u,v [‖Bt1‖2t2 ]
≤ ρ20(δ + δ
1
4 ) + Cδ
1
2 .
Then
|Yt1 | ≤ C
[
ρ0(δ + δ
1
4 ) + δ
1
4 + δ
]
= Cρ1(δ).
Plug this into (4.9) we complete the proof.
Combining Lemmas 4.2 and 4.5, it follows from standard arguments that
Theorem 4.6 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 hold true. For any (t, ω) ∈ Λ and τ ∈ T t,
we have
Y t(ω) = sup
u∈Ut
inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ω,u,vs
[
τ, Y t,ωτ
]
; Y t(ω) = inf
v∈Vt
sup
u∈Ut
Yt,ω,u,vs
[
τ, Y
t,ω
τ
]
.
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5 Viscosity solution properties
Define
G(t, ω, y, z, γ) := sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
[1
2
σ2(t, u, v) : γ + bσ(t, u, v)z + f(t, ω, y, zσ(t, u, v), u, v)
]
G(t, ω, y, z, γ) := inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
[1
2
σ2(t, u, v) : γ + bσ(t, u, v)z + f(t, ω, y, zσ(t, u, v), u, v)
]
;
(5.1)
and consider the following path dependent PDEs:
− ∂tYt −G(t, ω, Yt, ∂ωYt, ∂2ωωYt) = 0; (5.2)
−∂tYt −G(t, ω, Yt, ∂ωYt, ∂2ωωYt) = 0. (5.3)
Theorem 5.1 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 hold. Then Y (resp. Y ) is a viscosity
solution of PPDE (5.2) (resp. (5.3)).
Proof. We shall only prove that Y is a viscosity solution of the PPDE (5.2). The other
statement can be proved similarly.
Step 1. We first prove the viscosity supersolution property. Assume by contradiction
that there exists (t, ω) and ϕ ∈ ALY (t, ω) such that
c := ∂tϕ(t,0) + sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
{1
2
σ2(t, u, v) : ∂2ωωϕ(t,0) + bσ(t, u, v)∂ωϕ(t,0)
+f(t, ω, Y t(ω), ∂ωϕ(t,0)σ(t, u, v), u, v)
}
> 0.
By Remark (2.5), we can assume L is large enough as we will see later. Then there exists
u˜ ∈ U such that, for all v ∈ V
∂tϕ(t,0) +
1
2
σ2(t, u˜, v) : ∂2ωωϕ(t,0) + bσ(t, u˜, v)∂ωϕ(t,0)
+f(t, ω, Y t(ω), ∂ωϕ(t,0)σ(t, u˜, v), u˜, v) ≥
c
2
(5.4)
Let h ∈ Ht be the hitting time corresponding to ϕ in (3.2). For any ε > 0, set
hε := inf
{
s ≥ t : s− t+ |Bts| = ε
}
.
By choosing ε > 0 small enough, we have hε ≤ h. Since ϕ ∈ C1,2(Λt), there exist some
constant Cϕ ≥ C0 and modulus of continuity function ρϕ ≥ ρ1, which may depend on ϕ,
such that
|ψ(s,Bt)| ≤ Cϕ, |ψ(s,Bt)− ψ(t,0)| ≤ ρϕ(ε), for t ≤ s ≤ hε, ψ = ϕ, ∂tϕ, ∂ωϕ, ∂2ωωϕ. (5.5)
Now set u := u˜ ∈ Ut be a constant process and let v ∈ Vt be arbitrary. Fix δ > 0 and
denote hδε := hε ∧ (t+ δ),
Y := Yt,ω,u,v[hδε, Y t,ωhδε ], Z := Zt,ω,u,v[hδε, Y t,ωhδε ],
∆Ys := ϕ(s,B
t)− Ys, ∆Zs := ∂ωϕ(s,Bt)−Zs.
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Then, applying the functional Itoˆ’s formula we obtain:
d∆Ys =
[
∂tϕ+
1
2
∂2ωωϕ : σ
2(s, us, vs) + f
t,ω(·,Ys, Ẑs, us, vs)
]
(s,Bt)ds +∆ZsdB
t
s
=
[
∂tϕ+
1
2
∂2ωωϕ : σ
2(s, us, vs) + f
t,ω(·,Ys, Ẑs, us, vs)
]
(s,Bt)ds +∆ZsdB
t
s
=
[
∂tϕ+
1
2
∂2ωωϕ : σ
2(s, us, vs) + f
t,ω(·, Y t(ω), ∂ωϕ(·)σ(s, us, vs), us, vs)
]
(s,Bt)ds
+
[
αs(Ys − Y t(ω)) + ∆Ẑsβs
]
ds+∆ZsdB
t
s,
where |α|, |β| ≤ L0. By (5.4) and (5.5) we have
d∆Ys ≥
[ c
2
− Cϕρϕ(ε) −C|Ys − Y t(ω)|+∆Ẑsβs
]
ds+∆ZsdB
t
s, t ≤ s ≤ hδε.
Recall (3.4) and define dP :=MhδεdP
t,u,v, where
Ms := exp
(∫ s
t
[b(r, ur, vr) + βr]dW
t,u,v
r −
1
2
∫ s
t
|b(r, ur, vr) + βr|2dr
)
.
Then ∆ZsdB
t
s +∆Ẑsβsds is a P-martingale, and thus
∆Yt ≤ EP
[
∆Yhδε −
∫
hδε
t
[ c
2
− Cϕρϕ(ε) − C|Ys − Y t(ω)|
]
ds
]
By choosing L large enough, we see that P ∈ PtL. Then it follows from the definition of
ALY (t, ω) that
E
P[∆Yhδε ] = E
P
[
ϕ(hδε, B
t)− Y t,ω
hδε
]
≤ ϕ(t,0) − Y t(ω).
Therefore, since b and β are bounded,
Y t(ω)− Yt ≤ EP
[ ∫ hδε
t
[
− c
2
+ Cϕρϕ(ε) + C|Ys − Y t(ω)|
]
ds
]
≤ [− c
2
+ Cϕρϕ(ε)]δ + CϕδP(hε ≤ t+ δ) + CδEP
[
‖Y· − Y t(ω)‖hδε
]
≤ [− c
2
+ Cϕρ(ε)]δ + Cϕδ
(
P
t,u,v(hε ≤ t+ δ)
) 1
2
+ Cδ
(
E
Pt,u,v
[
‖Y· − Y t(ω)‖2hδε
]) 1
2
.(5.6)
Note that, for δ ≤ ε2 ,
P
t,u,v
(
hε ≤ t+ δ
)
≤ Pt,u,v
(
δ + ‖Bt‖t+δ ≥ ε
)
= Pt,u,v
(
‖Bt‖t+δ ≥ ε
2
)
≤ C
ε2
E
Pt,u,v
[‖Bt‖2t+δ] ≤ Cδε2 . (5.7)
Moreover, denote Y˜ := Y − Y t(ω). Then
Y˜s = Y t,ωhδε − Y t(ω) +
∫
hδε
s
f t,ω(r,Br, Y˜r + Y t(ω), Ẑr, ur, vr)dr −
∫
hδε
s
ZrdBtr.
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By (3.9) and applying Lemma 4.5 we obtain
E
Pt,u,v
[
‖Y· − Y t(ω)‖2hδε
]
≤ CEPt,u,v
[
|Y t,ω
hδε
− Y t(ω)|2
]
+ Cδ
≤ Cδ + CEPt,u,v
[
ρ21
(
d∞((t, ω), (t + δ, ω ⊗t Bt))
)]
≤ Cδ + CEPt,u,v
[
ρ21
(
d∞((t, ω), (t + δ, ω)) + ‖Bt‖t+δ)
)] ≤ Cρ2(δ), (5.8)
where
ρ2(δ) := δ + sup
(u,v)∈Ut×Vt
E
Pt,u,v
[
ρ21
(
d∞((t, ω), (t+ δ, ω)) + ‖Bt‖t+δ)
)]
. (5.9)
Plug (5.7) and (5.8) into (5.6), we have
Y t(ω)− Yt ≤ δ
[
− c
2
+ Cϕρϕ(ε) +
Cϕδ
1
2
ε
+ Cδρ
1
2
2 (δ)
]
.
It is clear that limδ→0 ρ2(δ) = 0. Then by first choosing ε small and then choosing δ small
enough, we have
Y t(ω)− Yt,ω,u,vt [hδε, Y t,ωhδε ] ≤ −
c
4
δ.
Since v is arbitrary, we get
Y t(ω)− inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ω,u,vt [hδε, Y t,ωhδε ] ≤ −
c
4
δ,
which implies further that
Y t(ω)− sup
u∈Ut
inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ω,u,vt [hδε, Y t,ωhδε ] ≤ −
c
4
δ < 0.
This contradicts with the dynamic programming principle Theorem 4.6. Therefore, Y is a
viscosity supersolution of PPDE (5.2).
Step 2. We now prove the viscosity subsolution property. Assume by contradiction that,
for some L large enough, there exists (t, ω) and ϕ ∈ ALY (t, ω) such that
−c := ∂tϕ(t,0) + sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
{1
2
σ2(t, u, v) : ∂2ωωϕ(t,0) + b(t, u, v)∂ωϕ(t,0)
}
+f(t, ω, Y t(ω), ∂ωϕ(t,0), u, v)
}
< 0.
Then there exists a mapping (no measurability is involved!) ψ : U → V such that, for any
u ∈ U,
∂tϕ(t,0) +
1
2
σ2(t, u, ψ(u)) : ∂2ωωϕ(t,0) + b(t, u, ψ(u))∂ωϕ(t,0)
+f(t, ω, Y t(ω), ∂ωϕ(t,0), u, ψ(u)) ≤ −
c
2
. (5.10)
20
For any u ∈ Ut, by the structure (3.5) one can easily see that v := ψ(u) ∈ Vt. Introduce
the same notations as in Step 1, and follow almost the same arguments, we obtain
Y t(ω)− Yt ≥ δ
[ c
2
− Cϕρϕ(ε) − Cϕδ
1
2
ε
− Cδρ
1
2
2 (δ)
]
.
Again, by first choosing ε small and then choosing δ small enough, we have
Y t(ω)− Yt,ω,u,vt [hδε, Y t,ωhδε ] ≥
c
4
δ.
This implies
Y t(ω)− inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ω,u,vt [hδε, Y t,ωhδε ] ≥
c
4
δ.
Since u is arbitrary, then
Y t(ω)− sup
u∈Ut
inf
v∈Vt
Yt,ω,u,vt [hδε, Y t,ωhδε ] ≥
c
4
δ > 0.
This contradicts with the dynamic programming principle Theorem 4.6. Therefore, Y is a
viscosity subsolution of PPDE (5.2).
We now assume the Isaacs condition:
G(t, ω, y, z, γ) = G(t, ω, y, z, γ) =: G(t, ω, y, z, γ), (5.11)
and consider the following path dependent Isaacs equation:
− ∂tYt −G(t, ω, Yt, ∂ωYt, ∂2ωωYt) = 0. (5.12)
Our main result of the paper is:
Theorem 5.2 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 hold. Assume further that the Isaacs
condition (5.11) and the uniqueness for viscosity solutions of the PPDE (5.12) hold. Then
Y = Y =: Y and is the unique viscosity solution of PPDE (5.12).
Proof. Applying Theorem 5.1 and by the uniqueness of viscosity solutions, we see imme-
diately that Y = Y and it is the unique viscosity solution of PPDE (5.12).
Remark 5.3 (i) For the comparison principle of viscosity solutions of PPDE (5.12), we refer
to Ekren, Touzi and Zhang [15]. We shall also provide a sufficient condition in Subsection
6 below.
(ii) In Markovian framework, the PPDE (5.12) becomes a standard PDE. Note that a
viscosity solution (resp. supersolution, subsolution) in the sense of Definition 2.4 is a viscos-
ity solution (resp. supersolution, subsolution) in the standard literature. Then, assuming
the comparison principle for standard viscosity solution of PDEs holds true, Y := Y = Y
and is the unique viscosity solution of the Bellman-Isaacs PDE with terminal condition
Y (T, x) = ξ(x)
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6 Comparison principle for viscosity solutions of PPDEs
In this section we study the comparison principle of PPDE (5.12), which clearly implies the
uniqueness required in Theorem 5.1.
We first cite a general result from [17] concerning wellposedness of PPDEs, adapting to
our setting. For any (t, ω) ∈ Λ, denote the following deterministic function with parameter
(t, ω):
gt,ω(s, y, z, γ) := G(s ∧ T, ω·∧t, y, z, γ). (6.1)
For any ε > 0 and η ≥ 0, we denote Tη := (1 + η)T , and
Oε := {x ∈ Rd : |x| < ε}, Oε := {x ∈ Rd : |x| ≤ ε}, ∂Oε := {x ∈ Rd : |x| = ε};
Oε,ηt := [t, Tη)×Oε, O
ε,η
t := [t, Tη ]×Oε), ∂Oε,ηt :=
(
[t, Tη ]× ∂Oε
) ∪ ({Tη} ×Oε), (6.2)
Consider the following localized and path-frozen PDE defined for every (t, ω) ∈ Λ:
(E)t,ωε,η L
t,ωth := −∂tθ − gt,ω(s, θ,Dθ,D2θ) = 0 on Oε,ηt . (6.3)
Here ∂t,D,D
2 are standard differential operators.
Assumption 6.1 For any ε > 0, η ≥ 0, (t, ω) ∈ Λ, and any h ∈ C0(∂Oε,ηt ), we have θ = θ,
where
θ(s, x) := inf
{
w(s, x) : w classical supersolution of (E)t,ωε,η and w ≥ h on ∂Oε,ηt
}
,
θ(s, x) := sup
{
w(s, x) : w classical subsolution of (E)t,ωε,η and w ≤ h on ∂Oε,ηt
}
.
(6.4)
By [17] Theorem 3.4, we have
Theorem 6.2 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, and the Isaacs condition (5.11) hold. Then,
under the additional Assumption 6.1, the PPDE (5.12) has a unique viscosity solution and
the comparison principle of viscosity solutions holds.
We remark that Assumption 6.1 is in the spirit of Perron’s approach. However, in stan-
dard literature the w in (6.4) is required only to be viscosity supersolution or subsolution,
while we require it to be a classical one. To check that, we present a result concerning
classical solutions of parabolic PDEs.
We first simplify the notations. Let O ⊂ Rd be open, connected, bounded, and with
smooth boundary. Set
O := [0, T )×O, O := [0, T ]×O, ∂O := ([0, T ] × ∂O) ∪ ({T} ×O).
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Consider the following (standard) PDE in O with boundary condition h:
− ∂tθ − g(t, x, θ,Dθ,D2θ) = 0 in O and θ = h on ∂O. (6.5)
Then we have the following result, whose argument is standard in the literature and is
communicated to us by Lihe Wang. We present its proof in Appendix for completeness.
Lemma 6.3 Assume
(i) h ∈ C1,2(O) and g(·, y, z, γ) ∈ C1,2(O) for any (y, z, γ);
(ii) g is continuously differentiable in (y, z, γ) with bounded derivatives;
(iii) ∂γg ≥ c0Id for some c0 > 0, and d ≤ 2.
Then the PDE (6.5) has a classical solution θ ∈ C1,2(O).
We now have
Proposition 6.4 Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, and the Isaacs condition (5.11) hold. As-
sume further that
σ ≥ c0Id for some c0 > 0 and the dimension d ≤ 2. (6.6)
Then Assumption 6.1 holds true. Consequently Y = Y =: Y and is the unique viscosity
solution of PPDE (5.12).
Proof. We use the notations in Assumption 6.1. By [16] Proposition 3.14, we may assume
without loss of generality that
G(·, y1, ·) −G(·, y2, ·) ≤ y2 − y1 for any y1 ≥ y2 (6.7)
First, one can easily extend h to a uniformly continuous function on [t,∞) × Rd, still
denoted as h. For any δ > 0, let gt,ωδ and hδ be smooth mollifiers of g
t,ω and h such that
‖gt,ωδ − g‖∞ ≤ δ, ‖hδ − h‖∞ ≤ δ. By our assumptions, it is clear that c0Id ≤ ∂γgt,ωδ ≤ L0Id.
Apply Lemma 6.3, the following PDE has a classical solution θδ ∈ C1,2(Oε,ηt ):
−∂tθδ − gt,ωδ (s, θδ,Dθδ,D2θδ) = 0, in Oε,ηt , θδ = hδ on ∂Oε,ηt .
Denote
θδ := θδ + δ and θδ := θδ − δ.
Then clearly θδ ∈ C1,2(Oε,ηt ), θδ ≥ h on ∂Oε,ηt . Moreover, by (6.7)
Lt,ωθδ = −∂tθδ − gt,ω(s, θδ + δ,Dθδ ,D2θδ)
≥ −∂tθδ − gt,ω(s, θδ,Dθδ,D2θδ) + δ
= gt,ωδ (s, θδ,Dθδ,D
2θδ)− gt,ω(s, θδ,Dθδ,D2θδ) + δ ≥ 0.
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Then θδ is a classical supersolution of (E)
t,ω
ε,η, and thus θ ≤ θδ. Similarly, θ ≤ θδ. Then
0 ≤ θ − θ ≤ θδ − θδ = 2δ.
Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that θ = θ.
7 Approximate saddle point
In this section we discuss briefly saddle points of the game, assuming the game value exists.
In our setting, it is natural to define
Definition 7.1 We call (u∗, v∗) ∈ U0 × V0 a saddle point of the game if
Y0,0,u,v∗0 ≤ Y0,0,u
∗,v∗
0 ≤ Y0,0,u
∗,v
0 for all u ∈ U0, v ∈ V0.
We remark that, if a saddle point (u∗, v∗) exists, then it is straightforward to check that the
game has a value Y0 := Y0,0,u
∗,v∗
0 . However, even in stochastic optimization problem with
diffusion control, in general the optimal control may not exist. We thus study approximate
saddle points only.
Definition 7.2 For any ε > 0, we call (uε, vε) ∈ U0 × V0 an ε-saddle point of the game if
Y0,0,u,vε0 − ε ≤ Y0,0,u
ε,vε
0 ≤ Y0,0,u
ε,v
0 + ε for all u ∈ U0, v ∈ V0.
We have the following simple observation:
Proposition 7.3 Assume the game has a value, then it has an ε-saddle point (uε, vε) for
any ε > 0.
Proof. Let Y 0 = Y0 = Y 0 be the game value. Then for any ε > 0, there exist u
ε ∈ U0, vε ∈
V0 such that
Y0 − ε < inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,uε,v0 ≤ Y0 ≤ sup
u∈U0
Y0,0,u,vε0 ≤ Y0 + ε.
In particular, this implies that
Y0 − ε < inf
v∈V0
Y0,0,uε,v0 ≤ Y0,0,u
ε,vε
0 ≤ sup
u∈U0
Y0,0,u,vε0 ≤ Y0 + ε.
That is, (uε, vε) is an ε-saddle point. Moreover, we observe that |Y0,0,uε,vε0 − Y0| ≤ ε.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
We prove the case AS only. The case AW can be proved similarly. Let X be the unique
strong solution to SDE (2.7) with coefficients (σ, b), and Xi be the unique strong solution
to SDE (2.7) on [t, T ] with coefficients (σi, bi).
First, denote
X¯s = Xs1[0,t)(s) +
[
Xt +
n∑
i=1
1Ei(X)X
i
s(B
t)
]
1[t,T ](s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
One can check straightforwardly that X¯ is a strong solution to SDE (2.7) with coefficients
(σ¯, b¯). On the other hand, let X˜ be an arbitrary strong solution to SDE (2.7) with coefficients
(σ¯, b¯). Then both X¯ and X˜ satisfy SDE (2.7) on [0, t] with coefficients (σ, b). By the
uniqueness assumption of (σ, b), we see that X¯ = X˜ on [0, t], P0-a.s. In particular, this
implies 1Ei(X¯) = 1Ei(X˜). Then for P0-a.e. ω ∈ Ω, there exists unique i such that 1Ei(X¯) =
1Ei(X˜) = 1. Thus both X¯
t,ω and X˜t,ω satisfy SDE (2.7) on [t, T ] with coefficients (σi, bi).
By the uniqueness assumption of (σi, bi), we see that X¯t,ω = X˜t,ω, Pt0-a.s. This implies that
X¯ = X˜, P0-a.s. and therefore, (σ¯, b¯) ∈ AS .
Finally, since X¯ = X on [0, t], we have Pσ¯,b¯ = Pσ,b on Ft. Moreover, since X¯t,ω(Bt) =
Xt(ω) +X
i(Bt) whenever 1Ei(X) = 1, by the definition of r.c.p.d. we see that (P
σ¯,b¯)t,ω =
P
t,σi,bi for Pσ,b-a.e. ω ∈ Ei.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Recall the Pt,u,v-Brownian motion W t,u,v defined in (3.4). One may rewrite BSDE (3.7) as
Ys = η +
∫ τ
s
[
f t,ω(r,Bt· ,Yr, Ẑr, ur, vr) + Ẑrb(r, ur , vr)
]
dr −
∫ τ
s
ẐrdW t,u,vr , Pt,u,v-a.s.
Then (3.8) follows from standard BSDE arguments. Moreover, note that
Ys = η +
∫ τ
s
[
f t,ω(r,Bt· , 0,0, ur , vr) + αrYr + Ẑrβr
]
dr −
∫ τ
s
ẐrdW t,u,vr , Pt,u,v-a.s.
where α, β are bounded. Denote
Γr := exp
(∫ r
t
βsdW
t,u,v
s +
∫ r
t
[αr − 1
2
|βr|2]dr
)
.
Then
Yt = Γτη +
∫ τ
s
Γrf
t,ω(r,Bt· , 0,0, ur , vr)dr −
∫ τ
s
[· · · ]dW t,u,vr , Pt,u,v-a.s.
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Thus
|Yt| =
∣∣∣EPt,u,v[Γτη +
∫ τ
s
Γrf
t,ω(r,Bt· , 0,0, ur , vr)dr
]∣∣∣
≤
(
E
Pt,u,v [Γ2τ ]
) 1
2
(
E
Pt,u,v [|η|2]
) 1
2
+δ
(
E
Pt,u,v [‖Γ‖2τ ]
) 1
2
(
E
Pt,u,v
[ ∫ τ
s
|f t,ω(r,Bt· , 0,0, ur , vr)|2dr
]) 1
2
.
It is clear that EP
t,u,v
[‖Γ‖2τ ] ≤ C. Then (3.9) follows immediately.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
We introduce the following capacity C:
C(A) := sup
(u,v)∈U0×V0
P
0,u,v(A), for all A ∈ FT . (8.1)
In this proof we abuse a notation a little bit by denoting Bsr := Br −Bs for 0 ≤ s ≤ r ≤ t.
Step 1. We first show that, for any c, δ > 0, and R > 0,
C
(
‖B‖t > R
)
≤ C
R4
and C
(
sup
0≤s≤t
‖Bs‖(s+δ)∧t ≥ c
)
≤ Cδ
c4
. (8.2)
Indeed, for any (u, v) ∈ U0 × V0 and any 0 ≤ t1 < t2, since σ and b are bounded, then by
(3.4) and applying the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy Inequality we get
E
P0,u,v
[
‖Bt1‖4t2
]
= EP
0,u,v
[
sup
t1≤s≤t2
∣∣∣ ∫ t2
t1
σ(r, ur, vr)b(r, ur, vr)dr +
∫ t2
t1
σ(r, ur , vr)dW
u,v)r
∣∣∣4]
≤ CEP0,u,v
[(∫ t2
t1
|σ(r, ur , vr)b(r, ur, vr)|dr
)4
+
(∫ t2
t1
|σ(r, ur, vr)|2dr
)2]
≤ C(t2 − t1)2. (8.3)
Then
P
0,u,v
(
‖B‖t > R
)
≤ 1
R4
E
P0,u,v
[
‖B‖4t
]
≤ C
R4
.
By the definiton of C, this implies the first estimate in (8.2).
Next, let 0 = t1 < · · · < tm = t such that δ ≤ ∆ti < 2δ for all i. Then
sup
0≤s≤t
‖Bs‖(s+δ)∧t = max
0≤i≤m−1
sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
sup
s≤r≤(s+δ)∧t
|Br −Bs|
≤ max
0≤i≤m−1
sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
sup
s≤r≤(s+δ)∧t
[
|Br −Bti |+ |Bs −Bti |
]
≤ 2 max
0≤i≤m−1
‖Bti‖ti+3δ.
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Then, noting that m ≤ T
δ
, by (8.3) we have
P
0,u,v
(
sup
0≤s≤t
‖Bs‖(s+δ)∧t ≥ c
)
≤ 1
c4
E
P0,u,v
[
sup
0≤s≤t
‖Bs‖4(s+δ)∧t
]
≤ C
c4
m−1∑
i=0
E
P0,u,v
[
‖Bti |4ti+3δ
]
≤ C
c4
mδ2 ≤ Cδ
c4
.
By the definition of C we obtain the second estimate in (8.2).
Step 2. We now fix ε > 0. For the constant C in (8.2), set
c :=
ε
3
, δ :=
c4ε
2C
∧ t = ε
5
162C
∧ t, R := (2C
ε
)
1
4 .
Let 0 = t0 < · · · < tm = t such that δ ≤ ∆ti ≤ 2δ, i = 1, · · · ,m. Clearly there exists a
partition {E˜j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n} ⊂ Ft such that
∪nj=1E˜j =
{
max
0≤i≤m
|Bti | ≤ R+ c
}
and max
0≤i≤m
|ωti − ω′ti | ≤
ε
3
for all ω, ω′ ∈ E˜i.
Now set
Ej := E˜j ∩A, where A :=
{
sup
0≤s≤t
‖Bs‖(s+δ)∧t ≤ c
}
∈ Ft.
Then for any ω, ω′ ∈ Ej,
‖ω − ω′‖t = max
0≤i≤m−1
sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
|ωs − ω′s|
≤ max
0≤i≤m−1
sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
[
|ωs − ωti |+ |ω′s − ω′ti |+ |ωti − ω′ti |
]
≤ max
0≤i≤m−1
sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
[ε
3
+
ε
3
+
ε
3
]
= ε.
On the other hand,
∩nj=1Ecj =
(
∪nj=1 E˜j
)c
∪Ac =
{
max
0≤i≤m
|Bti | > R+ c
}
∪Ac
⊂
({
max
0≤i≤m
|Bti | > R+ c
}
∩A
)
∪Ac.
For each ω ∈
{
max0≤i≤m |Bti | > R+ c
}
∩A, we have
‖ω‖t = max
0≤i≤m−1
sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
|ωs| ≥ max
0≤i≤m−1
sup
ti≤s≤ti+1
[
|ωti | − |ωs − ωti |
]
> (R+ c)− c = R.
That is, {
max
0≤i≤m
|Bti | > R+ c
}
∩A ⊂
{
‖B‖t > R
}
,
and therefore,
∩nj=1Ecj ⊂
{
‖B‖t > R
}
∪Ac.
Now it follows from (8.2) that C(∩nj=1Ecj ) ≤ ε.
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8.4 Proof of Lemma 6.3
As standard in PDE literature, it suffices to provide a priori estimates. That is, we assume
θ ∈ C1,2(O) satisfies PDE (6.5), and we shall provide estimates which depends only on the
parameters in our assumptions.
(i) We first establish the estimates in the case g = g(γ). We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. We first cite a result from Ladyzenskaya et al [25]. Assume θ satisfying the
following linear PDE:
−∂tθ − 1
2
A(t, x) : D2θ = 0,
where A = [aij ]1≤i,j≤d is required only to be measurable and 0 < c0Id ≤ A ≤ C0Id . Then
θ ∈ C
α
2
,α
loc , where α depends only on c0 and C0.
Step 2. We next cite a result by Caffarelli [6].
The elliptic PDE g(D2θ) = f(x) with f ∈ Cα has C2,α-solution
if the simplified PDE g(D2θ) = constant has C2,α˜-solution for some α˜ > α.
Step 3. We also need the DeGiorgi-Nash estimate: If
∑d
i,j=1Dxi(aijDxjθ) = 0, then
θ ∈ Cα. See, e.g., Gilbarg and Trudinger [20] Theorem 8.22.
Step 4. We now come back to the PDE (6.5) with g = g(γ). First, set θ˜ := ∂tθ.
Differentiate both sides of (6.5) with respect to t we obtain:
∂tθ˜ + [∂γg(D
2θ)] : D2θ˜ = 0.
By Step 1, we have ∂tθ = θ˜ ∈ C α2 ,α. Now fix t. Then (6.5) becomes
g(D2θ) = −∂tθ ∈ Cα.
By Step 2, it suffices to show that
g(D2θ) = constant has C2,α
′
-solution for some α′ > α (8.4)
For this, we can only prove in the cases d = 1 or d = 2.
In the case d = 1, notice that g is strictly increasing, then D2θ = constant and thus θ
is a parabola.
In the case d = 2, fix k = 1, 2 and denote θk := Dxkθ. Differentiate both sides of (8.4)
with respect to xk:
A : D2θk = 0, where A := [ai,j ]1≤i,j≤2 := ∂γg(D
2θ)
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Note that a11 ≥ c0 > 0. Then
D2x1x1θ
k +
a12
a11
D2x1x2θ
k +
a22
a11
D2x2x2θ
k = 0.
For l = 1, 2, differentiate both sides of the above PDE with respect to xl and denote
θk,l := Dxlθ
k = D2xkxlθ:
D2x1x1θ
k,l +Dxl
(a12
a11
D2x1x2θ
k
)
+Dxl
(a22
a11
D2x2x2θ
k
)
= 0.
In the case l = 2, this is:
Dx1(Dx1θ
k,2) +Dx2
(a12
a11
Dx1θ
k,2
)
+Dx2
(a22
a11
Dx2θ
k,2
)
= 0.
By Step 3, θk,2 ∈ Cα. Similarly, θk,1 ∈ Cα. That is, for any t, θ(t, ·) ∈ C2+α. Moreover, it
follows from PDE (6.5) that θ is differentiable in t and thus θ ∈ C1,2.
(ii). We now consider the general case where g = g(t, x, y, z, γ). We define a map
J : C1,2(O) → C1,2(O) by Jθ := θ˜, where, thanks to (i), θ˜ is the classical solution of the
following PDE:
−∂tθ˜ − g(t, x, θ,Dθ,D2θ˜) = 0 in O and θ˜ = θ on ∂O.
Now, following the arguments in [26] Theorem 8.2, one can show that the mapping J is a
contraction mapping if T is small enough. Moreover, the fixed point θ of the mapping J is
also in C1,2(O). Therefore, we can conclude the so called small time existence: the PDE
(6.5) has a classical solution when T is small enough.
Next, [26] Theorem 14.4 gives an a priori uniform estimate for the Ho¨lder-(1+δ) norm of
the classical solution to (6.5), for some δ ∈ (0, 1), where the definition of the Ho¨lder-(1 + δ)
norm is given in [26] Chapter IV, Section 1. Using this a priori estimate and following
the arguments in [26] Theorem 8.3, we can infer the existence of the classical solution over
arbitrary time duration [0, T ] from the small time existence, and thus complete the proof.
8.5 Buckdahn’s counterexample
As pointed out in Remark 3.7, a game with control against control in strong formulation
may not have the game value, even if the Isaacs condition and the comparison principle for
the associate Bellman-Isaacs equation hold. The following counterexample is communicated
to us by Rainer Buckdahn.
Example 8.1 Let d = 2, U := {x ∈ R : |x| ≤ 1}, V := {x ∈ R : |x| ≤ 2}, and U (resp.
V) be the set of F-progressively measurable U-valued (resp. V-valued) processes. Write
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B = (B1, B2). Given (u, v) ∈ U × V, the controlled state process Xu,v = (X1,u,X2,v) is
determined by:
X
1,u
t := αB
1
t +
∫ t
0
usds, X
2,v
t := αB
2
t +
∫ t
0
vsds
where α ≥ 0 is a constant. Define, for some a ∈ R,
J(u, v) := EP0
[
|a+X1,uT −X2,vT |
]
, Y 0 := sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
J(u, v), Y 0 := inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
J(u, v).
Then, for 0 ≤ α <
√
T
2 and |a| ≤ T , we have Y 0 < Y 0.
Proof. For any u ∈ U , set vt := ut + aT . Then v ∈ V and,
a+X1,uT −X2,vT = a+ αB1T +
∫ T
0
utdt− αB2T −
∫ T
0
[ut +
a
T
]dt = α[B1T −B2T ].
Thus
J(u, v) = αEP0
[
|B1T −B2T |
]
= α
√
2T .
This implies that infv∈V J(u, v) ≤ α
√
2T . Since u is arbitrary, we get
Y 0 ≤ α
√
2T . (8.5)
On the other hand, for any v ∈ V, set
ut := u0 :=
a− EP0 [X2,vT ]
|a− EP0 [X2,vT ]|
1
{a−EP0 [X2,v
T
] 6=0}
+ 1
{a−EP0 [X2,v
T
]=0}
. (8.6)
That is, u is a constant process. One can easily check that
u ∈ U , |u0| = 1, a− EP0 [X2,vT ] = u0|a− EP
0
[X2,vT ]|.
Then
E
P0
[
a+X1,uT −X2,vT
]
= a+ u0T − EP0 [X2,vT ] = u0
[
T + |a− EP0 [X2,vT ]|
]
.
Thus,
J(u, v) ≥
∣∣∣EP0[a+X1,uT −X2,vT ]∣∣∣ = |u0|[T + |a− EP0 [X2,vT ]|]
= T + |a− EP0 [X2,vT ]| ≥ T.
This implies supu∈U J(u, v) ≥ T . Since v is arbitrary, we have Y 0 ≥ T . This, together with
8.5, implies that Y 0 < Y 0 when 0 ≤ α <
√
T
2 .
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Moreover, note that in this case the system is Markovian and ∂ωY = DY . The Hamil-
tonians in (5.1) become: for (t, x, y, z, γ) ∈ [0, T ]× R2 × R× R2 × S2,
G(t, x, y, z, γ) := sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
[1
2
αtr (γ) + uz1 + vz2
]
=
1
2
αtr (γ) + z+1 − 2z−2 ;
G(t, x, y, z, γ) := inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
[1
2
αtr (γ) + uz1 + vz2
]
=
1
2
αtr (γ) + z+1 − 2z−2 .
Then the Isaacs condition holds, and the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equation becomes:
−∂tYt − 1
2
α
[
D2x1x1Yt +D
2
x2x2
Yt
]
− [Dx1Yt]+ + 2[Dx2Yt]− = 0.
It is clear that the comparison principle for the viscosity solutions of above PDE holds.
Remark 8.2 (i) The above counterexample stays valid when α = 0, and thus the game
is deterministic. We note that, even in deterministic case, our weak formulation is dif-
ferent from strong formulation. Indeed, the corresponding state process XW,u,v in weak
formulation is:
X
W,1,u,v
t =
∫ t
0
u(s,XW,1,u,v· ,X
W,2,u,v
· )ds, X
W,2,u,v
t =
∫ t
0
v(s,XW,1,u,v· ,X
W,2,u,v
· )ds.
In particular, XW,2,u,v depends on u as well. Consequently, given v, one cannot define u
through (8.6).
(ii) In this paper the drift coefficient is bσ, see (3.3), so the above deterministic example
is not covered in our current framework. However, this assumption is mainly to ensure the
wellposedness of the BSDE (3.7) . When f = 0, one may define the value processes via
conditional expectations, instead of Y. Then we may consider X in the form of (1.2) and
all our results, after appropriate modifications, will still hold true. In particular, the above
deterministic game in weak formulation has a value.
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